Cuba: on the way to market socialism? by Hoffmann, Bert
www.ssoar.info
Cuba: on the way to market socialism?
Hoffmann, Bert
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Hoffmann, B. (2010). Cuba: on the way to market socialism? (GIGA Focus International Edition, 5). Hamburg:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-275162
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Number 5
2010
ISSN 1862-3581
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
  E
D
IT
IO
N
Cuba: On the Way to Market Socialism?
Bert Hoffmann
Cuba’s government has initiated plans to lay off half a million state employees by March 
2011; an additional 500,000 employees are to follow. An expansion of the private sector 
will supposedly absorb the newly unemployed personnel.
Analysis
The acute state finance crisis has forced the Cuban government to undertake the most 
dramatic reform measure since Raúl Castro took office in July 2006. Nevertheless, the 
leadership continues to argue internally about how much market economy Cuba’s so-
cialism will permit.
The laid-off state employees are to transition to occupations in the “non-state sec-
tor.” This will entail the greatest opening up to private-sector economic activities 
since the 1959 revolution. With this opening, the question of new social disparities 
will become an acute one.
There is still no consensus among Cuba’s leadership regarding the future role of the 
private sector: For the reformers, the state should actively promote the new self- 
employed as an important part of a market socialism modeled after the Vietnam-
ese or Chinese example. However, still-powerful forces in the party and the bureau-
cracy see the private sector rather as a necessary evil which is politically dangerous 
and thus needs to be kept limited.
In many ways the reform will initially mean the “whitening” of already existing 
black-market activities. Nevertheless, there are many indications that the opening 
up to the private sector will take place, also in the future, largely without strong le-
gal foundations. While a lack of legal certainty provides the state with control and 
sanctioning power, it is also a hindrance to the economic dynamic which these re-
forms could generate for the economy as a whole.
With its awarding of the Sakharov Prize to Cuban dissident Guillermo Fariñas, the 
EU Parliament has demonstrated its solidarity with Cuba’s opposition. Although 
the EU has decided to maintain its “Common Position” on Cuba, it will nevertheless 
strengthen its efforts to make bilateral relations more flexible—not least because if it 
does not, increased solo action at the national level is to be expected.
Fidel Castro’s public appearances of recent weeks do not herald his political come-
back. To the contrary: Raúl Castro has consolidated his power; Fidel’s presence has 
served primarily to legitimate his brother’s government.
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The Economic Squeeze
It is often not so much an ailing model’s phase of 
agony that is most tricky, but rather the moment in 
which, after a long period of time, its repair is final-
ly begun. This is why it has taken so long for Cuban 
head of state Raúl Castro to actually initiate the re-
forms that he has been describing as unavoidable 
for the past four years. However, his mid-Septem-
ber 2010 announcement that half a million state em-
ployees would be laid off within six months has sig-
naled that, even for the conservative forces in Ha-
vana’s leadership, the adherence to an ever more 
precarious “carry-on” approach is no longer viable.
Since Raúl Castro took over office from his 
brother Fidel in July 2006, he has preached to the 
country about economic necessities in speeches 
and interviews: Cuba can only consume as much 
as it produces. State-owned enterprises must be-
come more efficient, so that the value of wages can 
increase again. The comprehensive subsidies and 
the paternalist state that takes care of everything 
are no longer financially viable (Hoffmann 2008). 
In sum, Raúl Castro has outlined an extensive re-
form agenda as being necessary for survival—but 
without implementing it.
Living conditions have indeed deteriorated dur-
ing Raúl Castro’s tenure; the state’s financial crisis 
has intensified dramatically. The international fi-
nancial crisis has negatively impacted tourism and 
remittances from emigrants. More serious still is 
the fact that support from Venezuela is no longer 
flowing as generously as before. As a result, in 2009 
Cuba reduced its import volume over the previous 
year from 8.84 million freight tons to 3.27 million, 
a decrease of no less than 60 percent, according to 
the National Statistics Bureau. In addition, domes-
tic production continued to decline. Bottlenecks 
and savings measures in providing for the needs of 
the population, as well as in the supply of the nec-
essary investment goods and primary products for 
state-owned enterprises, were the consequence.
In the agriculture sector, originally the poster 
child for Raúl Castro’s reform efforts, the results to 
date have been disastrous. Although 920,000 hect-
ares of idle state land has been leased to private 
farmers, a revival of production has not occurred. 
Nowhere have there been enough machetes, ma-
chines, seeds or fertilizer for the prospective farm-
1 S. Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas (2010): Anuario Estadístico 
de Cuba 2009; table 13.3, online: <www.one.cu/aec2009/esp/ 
20080618_tabla_cuadro.htm>.
ers to purchase. An additional problem has been 
the inadequate access to transport and marketing. 
Half of the newly allocated farmland, according to 
a recent statement by Economy Minister Murillo, 
continues to be unused.
Thus, instead of improving the supply situation, 
agricultural production has fallen further. In the first 
half of 2010 food production dropped by 7.5 per-
cent. Staple foods such as potatoes, milk and eggs 
were as much affected by the decline as the export 
products so important for the acquisition of foreign 
currency: a decrease of 14 percent over the previous 
year was recorded for tobacco, and the party news-
paper has conceded that this year’s sugarcane har-
vest is the lowest in 100 years.
Facing an acute liquidity crisis, the state lead-
ership decided at the beginning of 2009 to freeze 
the foreign currency accounts, valued at approxi-
mately 1 billion US dollars, of foreign trading part-
ners and businesses operating in the country. To-
day Cuba’s business partners still have only par-
tial access to their funds, and long payment de-
lays are the rule in several areas. With a few ex-
ceptions, Western investors’ thus remain reluctant 
to make new investments on the island.
The state financial crisis has also resulted in in-
creasing inflationary pressure on the Cuban cur-
rency. The memory of the first half of the 1990s, 
when the Cuban peso (CUP) went into freefall and 
a monthly wage was equivalent to little more than 
2 or 3 US dollars, is still present. One of the great-
est crisis management successes was the achieve-
ment of stabilization—although still at a low level. 
For years the exchange rate between the peso and 
the “convertible peso” (CUC), which is pegged to 
the US dollar, has oscillated around 1:25. In order 
to prevent a new inflationary spiral in the current 
crisis, cuts to state expenditures have now become 
unavoidable. The state has cut workplace canteens 
and eliminated the quota of cigarettes older people 
have received as part of their food cards (and which 
they often resold to support their meager pensions). 
But ultimately the government could not avoid ad-
dressing the fundamental problem: the hidden un-
employment, which has for years been “parked” in 
the hopelessly inflated staffing plans of the admin-
istration and the state-owned enterprises.
As early as April 2010, Raúl Castro spoke pub-
licly of a million excess employees who did not ac-
count for any productive achievement. Though his 
2 S. Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, online: <www.one.cu>.
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term to date had been characterized more by proc-
lamations than by implementation, this time he 
was serious. Thousands of workers have already 
received their pink slips, and leaked papers and 
Power Point slides detailing concrete numbers for 
the first 500,000 lay-offs for every province and 
municipality are circulating on the Internet. Even 
if only half of those laid off find work in the “non-
state sector”—as it is officially termed—this is the 
most far-reaching opening up to private econom-
ic activities since the nationalization of all urban 
small business in 1968.
Farewell to Überfather State—But What Will 
Take His Place?
“A crisis exists when the old dies and the new can’t 
be born,” wrote Italian Marxist Gramsci. Applied 
to Cuba, this means the following: the recently an-
nounced lay-offs are the last rites of a socialist model 
based on an omnipresent state. This was most prob-
ably what Fidel meant with his much-cited remark 
to American journalist Jeffrey Goldberg that “the 
Cuban model doesn’t even work for us anymore.”3
Too much has no doubt been interpreted into 
Fidel’s statement when it has been read as a con-
fession that the revolution or socialism as a whole 
have failed. Nevertheless, the comment was im-
portant in that it showed that even the revolu-
tion’s historical leader no longer has an ace up his 
sleeve that could prolong yesterday into tomor-
row. It is also symptomatic of a serious problem: 
as resolutely as Cuba’s leadership is now declar-
ing the end of the old statist economy, it is remain-
ing equally vague in drawing the contours of the 
new model that is to take the former’s place. This 
reflects the lack of consensus on the issue within 
the political elite.
Cubans must thus glean a sense of their coun-
try’s future economic model from bite-sized state-
ments and many rumors. The communiqué pub-
lished in the party newspaper spoke of a “reduc-
tion of 500,000 workers in the state sector and a 
corresponding increase in the non-state sector,” 
without developing further.4 Meanwhile it leaked 
3 Goldberg, Jeffrey (2010), Fidel: “Cuban Model Doesn’t Even 
Work for Us Anymore,” in: The Atlantic Monthly, 8 September, 
online: <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/09/ 
fidel-cuban-model-doesnt-even-work-for-us-anymore/62602/>.
4 Pronunciamiento de la Central de Trabajadores de Cuba, in: 
Granma, 13 September 2010, 8, online: <www.granma.cubaweb. 
cu/2010/09/13/nacional/artic01.html>.
out that approximately 250,000 licenses for “self-
employment” (trabajo	por	cuenta	propia) were to be 
given out. In addition, a list with 178 occupations 
selected for such work circulated, most of which, 
however, were within the low-skill service sector 
In many respects the reform may simply result in 
the authorization of black-market activities that 
have to date been forbidden. For instance, farm-
ers who have sold their products at the sides of ru-
ral roads have until now had to hide from inspec-
tors (or bribe them); now they are allowed to build 
small sales stands.
Lease models and the authorization of cooper-
atives for small enterprise and service provision 
are supposed to accompany the above changes. 
As part of a pilot model, employees of state hair 
salons have been offered the possibility of self-
employment as the lessees of their respective es-
tablishments. Even after rent and taxes are de-
ducted, this promises most of them significantly 
more earnings than the state wage. But when such 
changes are intended to occur on a large scale, 
subsequent reforms are unavoidable: the struc-
tures within which market actors operate—from 
sales venues for the inputs and tools required by 
the new self-employed workers to a differentiated 
tax system and transparent rules in the case of in-
solvency—need to be established. An internal par-
ty document leaked to the AP news agency warns 
already that a substantial proportion of the newly 
self-employed could give up within the first year.5 
It does not reveal which social safety net they then 
will be able to rely upon.
“Self-employment”—A Magic Formula?
After the 1968 “Revolutionary Offensive” campaign 
nationalized approximately 50,000 small stores and 
enterprises, from cobblers to lemonade vendors, 
agriculture was the only economic sector where 
the possession of private property was maintained: 
roughly 450,000 small farmers, all bound within a 
tight corset of planning and price provisions and 
the organizational structures of the official small 
farmers association (ANAP).
In the crisis following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, a new modality of self-employment was ini-
tiated in 1993: the so-called trabajo	por	cuenta	propia. 
5 As Power Point document at: <www.penultimosdias.com/2010/ 
09/14/la-reforma-que-viene/>.
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The granting of licenses, however, remained subject 
to a multitude of restrictions. Although this type of 
employment was initially envisioned for 157 profes-
sions in the service-provision and small-enterprise 
sectors, almost 80 of these—including those most 
requested and most economically relevant, such as 
taxi-driving or the operation of small-scale restau-
rants—were put on hold; while they weren’t actu-
ally forbidden, new licenses were not granted and 
expired licenses were not renewed. Furthermore, 
countless licenses were revoked because of alleged 
violations of hygiene rules, the procurement of sup-
plies on the black market, or tax violations. As a re-
sult, only approximately 140,000 Cubans are today 
registered as trabajadores	por	cuenta	propia, less than 
4 percent of the island’s workforce. 
Compared to the experiences of the 1990s some 
regulations are now less restrictive: the self-em-
ployed are now allowed to employ personnel from 
outside of their family circle—an important step 
in actually moving from “self-employment” to a 
small-enterprise dynamic. They will also be al-
lowed to sell to state enterprises and institutions. 
In the past the latter organizations were not per-
mitted to purchase from such ideologically objec-
tionable entities. However, a look at the country’s 
past experiences cautions against excessive expec-
tations. Above all, it illustrates how much depends 
on the “small print”—on the design of the accom-
panying rules and on the actual implementation 
in practice. Just because licenses are to be grant-
ed does not mean there has been an indication of 
who, and under what conditions, can get one. 
Official information on this point has so far 
been scant. One of the reform-minded econo-
mists, Pavel Vidal of Havana’s Centro de Estudios 
de la Economía Cubana (CEEC), thus demanded 
on Cuban radio, “There must be a commitment 
that this is not a short-term adjustment but rather 
a structural change, and to accept that the Cuban 
economic model needs this non-state sector.” In 
other words: self-employment should not just be 
an emergency solution in the context of crisis, but 
rather part of a dynamic market socialism, such 
as that which the Vietnamese or Chinese models 
have implemented with noteworthy success.
Together with his colleague Omar Everleny, Vi-
dal has written the first available analysis of the re-
form process produced by academics working with-
in Cuba’s official institutions. It is part of the gov-
ernment’s bizarre information policy that this anal-
ysis was published in the least formal way possi-
ble, so as not to compromise the government in any 
way: as an online document in the Havana Catho-
lic Church’s magazine Espacio	Laical.6 The authors 
stress the enormous challenges the reform process 
faces due to the fact that the necessary adjustments 
have been postponed far too long over recent years. 
The problems are aggravated by the “absence of an 
alternative theoretical model that has been agreed 
upon by consensus, both politically and socially.”7 
The adequate forum for formulating such a strate-
gic consensus could be the long-overdue sixth Con-
gress of Cuba’s Communist Party; however, this 
continues to be postponed and there has been no 
hint as to when it will be called to order.
One aspect of the newest measures that has so 
far scarcely received attention, either domestically 
or among foreign observers, is their impact on gen-
der equality within the labor force. Seen from an 
international perspective, women make up a very 
high percentage of the workforce in general, and 
the highly qualified professions in particular. In 
the private sector, however, this is quite different. 
Here, according to official data, only one of every 
seven workers is a woman. Three-quarters of Cu-
bans working in the private sector are small farm-
ers, and in rural areas—and not just in Cuba—tra-
ditional gender relationships have held on longer 
than in urban areas. But even among those current-
ly registered as self-employed in urban areas the 
situation is no better: of the approximately 140,000 
registered trabajadores	por	cuenta	propia, only 32,000 
are women—less than a quarter.8 The question is 
thus to what extent the imminent cuts to the state 
sector will accelerate the gender-specific division 
of the labor market—together with unequal earn-
ing potential—to the disadvantage of women.
Another driver of new social inequalities is the 
question of access to capital in order to successful-
ly start up a small enterprise. Here the emigrants 
come into the picture. The millions of dollars in re-
mittances that they have sent to date have gone al-
most exclusively to consumption. Now these dol-
lars could in principle also be invested—for in-
stance, in proper kitchen equipment to bake piz-
za more efficiently than one’s competing neighbor. 
This means that all those without family members 
6 Pavel Vidal Alejandro / Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva: “En-
tre el ajuste fiscal y los cambios estructurales: Se extiende el 
cuentapropismo en Cuba,” Espacio Laical, suplemento digi-
tal, October 2010, 112, published by the Archdiocese of Ha-
vana (http://espaciolaical.org/contens/esp/sd_112.pdf).
7 Ibid., p. 2.
8 S. Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas, online: <www.one.cu>.
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abroad do not have access to a level playing field 
for their economic activities. And having family 
abroad is largely related to social and ethnic status: 
the majority of emigrants are identified as “white” 
Cubans, as are the recipients of their monetary 
support. The government is aware of this problem 
and has already stated that it will provide credit 
for the newly self-employed. Yet scarcely any Cu-
ban will have grand illusions about how extensive 
this credit will be given the state’s empty coffers.
Elite Cohesion and Reform Inertia
Since taking over office from his brother Fidel four 
years ago, Cuban leader Raúl Castro has consol-
idated his power. Almost all the important po-
sitions within the state apparatus have been re-
placed, and the parallel structures that Fidel had 
outfitted with significant power—such as the so-
called “office for the battle of ideas”—have been 
completely demolished. At the top of the political 
elite remain only a few who do not owe their cur-
rent position to an ascent under Raúl. The military, 
which Raúl led for half a century as defense min-
ister, has obtained noticeably more power with-
in the state apparatus. Raúl has promoted his son 
Alejandro Castro to a key position within the state 
security apparatus. Simultaneously, Fidel is com-
plying, despite improved health, with his role as 
an honorary pensioner who does not interfere di-
rectly in domestic politics.
Despite the resultant security of his position, 
Raúl’s overarching political logic remains elite co-
hesion. This is the central lesson that Cuba’s lead-
ership took from the breakdown of the regimes in 
Eastern Europe: fractures within the elite are to be 
avoided at any cost. Carlos Lage, long the third 
man behind the Castro brothers, and Foreign Min-
ister Pérez Roque were ousted a year ago, not least 
because, according to Castro, “the external enemy 
held illusions about them.” On the other hand, 
Raúl, in order to secure the unanimity of the appa-
ratus, positioned several long-serving veterans of 
the revolution in central positions of power. The 
most prominent example is the 79-year-old hard-
liner Machado Ventura, who was appointed vice 
president. In the past Machado Ventura was in 
charge of the cadre movements within the Com-
munist Party; therefore, the calculation will have 
been that no one could better provide for party 
discipline. The comeback of the 78-year-old Co-
mandante Ramiro Valdés, the founder of Cuba’s 
state security service and a long-time interior min-
ister, is also intended to dispel any suspicion that 
the old rivalry between the Ministry of the Interior 
and the armed forces could be rekindled again.
This political imperative of absolute elite cohe-
sion nevertheless has high costs. When the most 
conservative forces also need to be integrated in-
to the decision-making apparatus for reasons of 
political stability, they can likely claim some ve-
to power in the case of the aspired-to liberaliza-
tion measures. If Machado Ventura gets the older 
party comrades and the unions to give their nod 
to the lay-off package, he may in turn possess sig-
nificant weight with which to push for the control 
and containment of private activities. 
A political leadership made up of 70- to 80-
year-old revolutionary veterans may be helpful 
for elite cohesion, but it hardly serves to renew the 
government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the popu-
lation. Similarly, the assignment of the task of an-
nouncing the mass lay-offs in the state sector to 
the leadership of the official CTC labor union was 
in keeping with the logic of elite unanimity. The 
union proved its loyalty and demanded the full 
understanding of all Cubans for this necessary 
step towards the “updating of the economic mod-
el.” However, such an approach leads to the fur-
ther discrediting of the unions in the eyes of work-
ers and employees, who perceive the former as 
mouthpieces for the state apparatus.
The changes in the domestic economy were 
preceded by a step towards the further opening 
up to foreign capital. In August 2010 the Cuban 
government published a decree that provides in-
vestors with land-use rights for 99 years. This 
measure is initially intended to support the estab-
lishment of golf courses and luxury resorts for the 
high-end segments of international tourism. Be-
yond the immediate target-group, however, it sig-
nals a potential readiness to also open up other 
parts of the real estate sector to foreign capital. In 
virtually no other area does the Cuban state pos-
sess so much “table silver” with which to supple-
ment its sagging coffers. For this reason specula-
tion is now rife regarding the extent to which the 
state is planning further real estate transactions, 
beyond the golf course deals, in order to draw for-
eign investment to the country.
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Politics in Negotiation Mode
Cuba’s political leadership has shown little read-
iness to allow the increased participation of the 
Cuban population in the re-design of the social-
ist economic model. However, it has demonstrat-
ed a new political pragmatism in its relations with 
the opposition. At the beginning of July 2010 the 
gradual release of the 52 regime opponents who 
were still imprisoned as a result of the arrests of 
the “black spring” of 2003 began—the largest re-
lease of political prisoners for decades. Even more 
notable than the number was the way in which 
this release came to be. It was not a gesture of 
grace from above; it was much more the case that 
the state was reacting to growing pressure from 
the opposition, due on the one hand to the hunger 
strikes by Orlando Zapata, who died on February 
23, 2010, and Guillermo Fariñas, and on the other 
to the protest marches by the Damas	de	Blanco, the 
relatives of the imprisoned dissidents.
The prisoners’ release was the result of a com-
plex negotiation process mediated by the Catholic 
Church and the Spanish government. The opposi-
tion was not directly involved, a fact that it criti-
cized sharply; however, the process gave it an im-
plicit recognition such as it had never before re-
ceived. Eventually, opposition members did do 
their part for a constructive outcome to the nego-
tiations: directly after the Church announced the 
negotiated release of the prisoners over the com-
ing months, one of the opposition’s most promi-
nent voices, Cuba’s much acclaimed blogger Yo-
ani Sánchez, went to the hospital bed of Guiller-
mo Fariñas, who was hovering between life and 
death, to persuade him—with success—to break 
off his hunger strike.
Part of the deal was that the dissidents would 
receive political asylum in Spain. This resulted 
in at times heavy criticism that the amnesty was 
accompanied by de facto expatriation. Both the 
Church and the Spanish foreign minister denied 
this, stating that leaving the country was not a 
condition of release; however, in all cases so far 
the released prisoners have left the island.
The release of the prisoners has been inter-
preted abroad mostly as a gesture directed at the 
EU. However, it is much more. Its domestic polit-
ical meaning entails much more than just the con-
crete case itself. Any success in substantial nego-
tiations between the holders of power and the op-
position—not to mention the future scenario of a 
negotiated	 regime	 transition—depends on at least 
three factors:
that there are mediators who are accepted by 
both sides;
that central actors on both sides also accept the 
negotiation outcomes when these only partly 
fulfill their demands; and
that both sides have a minimum level of trust 
that the other side is willing and able to fulfill 
the agreements made.
The negotiated release of the prisoners represents 
an unparalleled precedent in terms of all three of 
these points. 
EU Policy: No Farewell to the “Common Position”
Spain has used its successful mediation in the re-
lease of the prisoners to renew its demands for a 
revision of Europe’s Cuba policy. Since 1996 the 
EU has stuck to the “Common Position,” which 
makes its relations with Havana dependent on an 
improvement of the human rights situation there. 
The Cuban government views this as a hostile ap-
proach intended to force regime change from the 
outside and has in turn made improved relations 
with the EU dependent on the latter’s abandon-
ment of the Common Position. 
The EU member states remain divided in their 
assessments of whether human rights in Cuba 
should be promoted through a hard position or 
through dialogue. The German government has 
adopted a noticeably tougher stance since Guido 
Westerwelle took office as foreign minister. Most 
recently, the EU Parliament has added to a hard-
ening of positions by awarding the Sakharov Prize 
for Freedom of Thought to Cuban dissident Guill-
ermo Fariñas on October 21, 2010; it was his hunger 
strike that led to the negotiations for the release of 
the political prisoners. This is the third time within 
nine years that the European Union’s highest hu-
man rights award has been given to a Cuban dis-
sident, giving the island a truly disproportionate 
role in the EU’s global human rights concerns.
It thus came as no surprise that the October 25 
meeting of the European foreign ministers did not 
follow Spain’s quest to abandon the Common Po-
sition. At the same time, there is broad discontent 
within the EU, among a wide spectrum of ideolog-
ical positions, with a political line which has been 
a)
b)
c)
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fixed for 14 years, which allows limited flexibili-
ty, and which is no longer completely supported 
by important actors in Europe’s Cuba policy. This 
has in the past led repeatedly to national solo ac-
tions that have thwarted the EU’s intended joint-
foreign-policy approach. As a consequence, while 
not dropping the Common Position the foreign 
ministers’ meeting did open a door to a new lev-
el of dialogue by mandating EU High Representa-
tive Catherine Ashton to explore the possibilities 
for a bilateral agreement. However, it takes two to 
tango, and it remains uncertain whether the Cu-
ban government will find these terms acceptable. 
The Common Position states that European pol-
icy aims for “a process of transition to a pluralist 
democracy and respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms.” That this goal has not been 
achieved is evident. Nevertheless, the EU demon-
strates daily in its relations with many of the world’s 
states that improvements far below the level of full 
democratization can be valid foreign policy goals.
A change in perspective of this sort has become 
evident in the USA since Obama took office. It has 
manifested as a series of moves towards a grad-
ual détente policy, be it the legalization of remit-
tances from emigrants or a whole array of easy-
to-implement normalization efforts, from the re-
sumption of postal services to joint efforts to pro-
tect the sharks in the Gulf of Mexico. The old bo-
geyman image of the empire in the north, which 
had such a high legitimating value for the Cuban 
revolution over five decades, has not entirely dis-
appeared as a result, but it has paled considerably. 
Thus when Cuban foreign minister Bruno Rodrí-
guez declares, as he did recently, that the “block-
ade” of Cuba has been strengthened under Obama 
(Reuters, 15.09.2010), this is a thesis with very lim-
ited persuasive power, not only abroad but also 
on the island.
At the political as well as the economic level, 
Cuba has for now left the phase of immobilism. Po-
litically, the negotiated release of imprisoned oppo-
nents has marked an increase in the civility of the 
government’s relations with the opposition—only 
half a year after the former sent organized mobs 
to harass dissidents. Economically, the announced 
expansion of the private sector has, despite the re-
maining scepticism regarding its implementation, 
fundamentally shifted the coordinates of the eco-
nomic policy debate. The result is still far removed 
from a coherent policy of economic reform or po-
litical liberalization, but in both areas there have 
been steps that seemed entirely unimaginable un-
der the aegis of Fidel Castro.
Foreign policy that cannot react in a differenti-
ated manner to such changes threatens to become 
a mere expression of a political credo, and to fail 
to offer incentives to induce political change. For 
this reason, the current developments should also 
provide the sceptics within the EU with cause to 
identify ways to a more flexible policy. The “Viet-
namese model” is not just something that’s be-
ing discussed by Cuba’s economists; for the Eu-
ropean Union it could also be helpful to reconsid-
er how and why it came to adopt a pragmatic poli-
cy of constructive	engagement with Communist Par-
ty-ruled Vietnam, as well as why a similar logic 
couldn’t also apply in the case of Cuba.
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